UMP moderates, blaming Sarkozy's inner circle, ascribed his defeat to this line (Le Monde, 6 May 2012; Bachelot, 2012, 169-170) . More detached analysts have seen the strategy as the only way to persuade Marine Le Pen's first-round voters to switch to Sarkozy for the run-off (Piar, 2012, 39; Chiche and Dupoirier, 2012, 210-211 ). Sarkozy's right-wing supporters pointed out that he had nearly closed Hollande's early poll lead, and claimed that two more weeks' campaigning would have secured his re-election. From this viewpoint, Sarkozy's (narrow) defeat became a moral victory, his policies justified by events and in need of systematisation not change.
This was the task Copé assigned to Hervé Mariton, the solidly right-wing Deputy for the Drôme who became the party's délégué general au projet from December 2012. Mariton organised a series of thematic conventions during 2013, covering immigration, defence, policing, pensions, business and labour deregulation, taxation, the family (including opposition to same-sex marriage), the disabled, and Europe (UMP, 2014a). Their conclusions flowed into a projet d'alternance, ratified by the party's National Council on 25 January 2014. It included, for example, a 'final end' to the 35-hour working week instituted by the Socialists fifteen years earlier; public spending cuts worth 130 billion euros; a social housing sell-off; limits to immigrants' rights to be joined by family members; and a rise in the retirement age to 65 from 2023 (UMP, 2014b) .
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The programme, somewhat less economically radical, more European, and more socially conservative than that of the British Conservatives, offered no big innovations compared to earlier French right-wing platforms (RPR, 1984) . But it was not really intended to; this was, to quote the title of Copé's book, a Manifeste pour une droite décomplexée (Copé, 2012) , set to continue the Sarkozy presidency, though not necessarily with Sarkozy in charge.
The extra-parliamentary opposition (B-head) Unremarkably for a party newly in opposition, the UMP spent much of 2013 looking inwards.
But the opposition repeatedly filled French streets that year: not primarily party militants, but activists who joined new, sometimes ephemeral, social movements reacting to the Left's policies in power. Indirectly, they offered the UMP a valuable opportunity to connect with civil society.
Street demonstrations have traditionally been viewed as a typically left-wing phenomenon, offensive to the Right's penchant for public order (Tartakowsky, 2013, 8-10, 146 ). Yet under the Fifth Republic, the Right has achieved significant successes on the street. In spring 1984, for example, vast demonstrations secured the withdrawal of a bill regulating private (Catholic) schooling, and toppled first Education Minister Alain Savary and then the whole government.
That mobilisation had been greatly assisted by the Church. So was the biggest right-wing social movement of 2013, the 'Manif pour tous', a campaign of protest against the government's bill allowing same-sex marriage. Tabled in the National Assembly on 29 January, the bill fulfilled one of Hollande's campaign promises. Opinion polls showed that 60 per cent of the French favoured it (though they were less sure about adoption by same-sex couples) (IFOP, 2013b (IFOP, , 2013c (IFOP, , 2013d . For the unpopular Hollande, this was an apparent AK Son of Sarko July 2014 5 opportunity to remobilise his own camp and to isolate the Right. The scale of opposition was therefore surprising: on 17 November 2012, as the government finalised the bill, 70,000 demonstrators were in the streets of Paris; on 13 January 2013 there were 340,000 according to the police, 800,000 according to the organisers; on 24 March the figures were 300,000 and 1.4 million, and on 26 May there were still 150,000. By that time the bill, including adoption rights, had become law; the first gay marriage took place on 29 May.
The movement had had secular and almost modish beginnings, down to the hitherto leftish term manif. Its first spokesperson, Virginie Tellenne (aka Frigide Barjot), an occasional rock performer and stand-up comic for over two decades, had excellent media contacts. Wealthy Catholics such as Claude Bébéar, former head of AXA, used her to shake off the image of Catholic activists as well-heeled and fusty traditionalists. But the Manif pour tous also attracted support from the Catholic hierarchy (including André Vingt-Trois, CardinalArchbishop of Paris), and from a broad constellation of right-wing traditionalist and far-right groups. Barjot herself disowned the movement in May 2013 when activists turned from opposition to gay marriage to more general attacks on homosexuals (Canard Enchaîné, 2013, 6-7) .
Failing to prevent gay marriage, the protests still achieved two things. First, they effectively blocked further measures offensive to traditional views of the family, in particular surrogate parenting and assisted reproductive technology. A brief, small-scale revival of the Manif pour tous on 2 February 2014 was enough for the government to shelve a further family law, to the consternation of the Socialist majority. Second, the protests offered opportunities to rightwing parties. These were not picked up unhesitatingly. In the FN, Marine Le Pen's former rival Bruno Gollnisch attended the January demonstration; Le Pen herself, who counts several gay advisers, did not. Moderates in the UMP leadership like François Fillon and Alain Juppé stayed away. But Copé took part in January, and Mariton marched in April, arm-in-arm with AK Son of Sarko July 2014 6 Gilbert Collard, an FN Deputy. More important, perhaps, the movement initiated tens of thousands of (often young) recruits into right-wing activism (Tartakowsky, 2013, 193 (Canard Enchaîné, 2013, 9, 37) .
So, potentially, were the other movements that flourished in Hollande's first 18 months in power, notably the 'pigeons' (small entrepreneurs opposed to the Left's taxation policies) and the Bonnets Rouges, a Brittany-based collective organised against the planned carbon tax.
Neither was led by the UMP, though both included individual party members; above all, the electronic media on which the movements' speedy constitution depended also offered UMP activists valuable networks for future election campaigns (Le Monde, 29 October, 13 and 22
November 2013).
A re-emergent Centre (B-head) Meanwhile the UMP's leadership crisis of 2012, detailed below, and its increasingly rightward leanings, opened space for a revived Centre (Perrineau, 2012) . Squeezed by the Fifth Republic's bipolarised party system, the Centre has faced the constant challenge of remaining independent while maintaining the alliances necessary to win office (Knapp, 2004, 199-233) . In 2002, most Centre politicians had joined the newly-formed UMP, some of them, The opposition has three major handicaps to overcome to regain national credibility: its uncertain leadership, its policy divisions, and (in the UMP's case) an ever-denser web of scandal.
The leadership problem (B-head)
Leadership is at the heart of the Fifth Republic's presidentialised party system. Effective party leaders are credible presidential candidates, and vice versa. But both the Centrists and the UMP have suffered from a leadership problem since 2012.
The Centrists' difficulty is the simpler to outline. Their most high-profile figure, especially after Borloo's retirement, was indisputably Bayrou, who had led the UDF, twice held office as and Yves Jégo -had held ministerial office under Sarkozy; none, however, has anything like Bayrou's name recognition or support (IFOP, 2014b; TNS-SOFRES, 2014b ). In the absence of any obvious standard-bearer of their own, the Centrists may throw their weight behind an acceptable UMP candidate in 2017. In the meantime, however, the UDI scheduled its own, potentially divisive, leadership election for November 2014, with at least Morin and Lagarde promising to run and Borloo still aspiring to be kingmaker behind the scenes.
The UMP's leadership difficulties are greater, and the stakes higher, because it is one of two parties (with the Parti Socialiste) that can normally hope to win the presidency of the Republic (Grunberg and Haegel, 2007) . But it is also what Angelo Panebianco (1988) has termed a 'weakly institutionalised' party, lacking clearly established procedures for reconciling the policy divisions and personal rivalries that are the stuff of party life.
Moreover, as Haegel (2012, 135-7) observes, the symbiosis which developed over a decade between the UMP, the presidency, and the government made the move to opposition especially problematic.
The institutional weakness has been compounded by Sarkozy. After 2007 he engineered changes to the UMP's statutes, which now stated that when a UMP member became president of the Republic, the office of party president would lapse, leaving party management to its secretary-general and two assistants -under implicit guidance from the Élysée (Huertas, 2013, 27-9; UMP, 2014d) Quietly, though, he made sure to telephone selected UMP Deputies as they were re-elected in June 2012 ('Bonjour, c'est Nicolas') (Huertas, 2013, 103) . 'Privately', Sarkozy made carefully-judged appearances at party meetings, or at his wife Carla Bruni's concerts (Le Monde, 30 January, 11 February 2014) . This calculated teasing condemned his party to a future of permanent internal competition for the leadership. Even after his television interview of 2 July 2014, when his return was scarcely in doubt, its form and timing remained uncertain.
Six months after Sarkozy's defeat, the UMP held a chaotic, crooked, indecisive election to the revived party presidency. Six candidates stood, but the UMP's membership got a reasonably clear choice between the two front-runners: Sarkozy's long-suffering former Prime Minister, François Fillon, and Copé, UMP secretary-general since 2010. Both men sought to bury Sarkozy, but in different ways. Fillon aimed to distance himself, and the UMP, from Sarkozy's rightward turn, called for a critical 'inventory' of his presidency, and made a statesmanlike appeal for tough decisions to restore France's economy. Copé, by contrast, pleaded for a Droite décomplexée (Copé, 2012) , and focused on law and order and immigration, reaching a dramatic climax with the claim that Moslems enforcing the Ramadan fast were snatching breakfast-time pains au chocolat from schoolchildren in Meaux. This AK Son of Sarko July 2014 11 resembled a continuation of Sarkozy's campaign, down to the body language (Latrous and Marteau, 156) -but without Sarkozy.
Starting with the support of no more than 25 per cent of UMP sympathisers in August to Fillon's 60 (IFOP, 2012a), Copé nevertheless took the presidency. One explanation was that the real vote, unlike the polls, was confined to members, more committed and more radical than sympathisers. But the campaign counted too. Both men wanted the UMP presidency to further their ambitions for 2017. But Fillon, never much of a party man, saw control of the UMP merely as a means to an end, whereas Copé actively relished running the apparatus.
Fillon, recovering from a broken ankle sustained on holiday, ran a low-key campaign; Copé, as Sarkozy's spiritual heir, a hyperactive one. Fillon lunched with local notables, whom he took to be opinion-formers; Copé made a barn-storming appeal to the 'people' against the party's 'barons'. Those differences eroded Fillon's early lead.
Copé shaped his own victory in other ways, too. Unconstrained by the UMP's ambiguous statutes, he remained as secretary-general, and thus as de facto party leader. Fillon complained bitterly of this conflict of interest, with much justification. Copé's team mobilised full-time party workers for his campaign; organised dubious proxies on a massive scale; manipulated overseas votes; and ensured that polling stations were twice as numerous, per party member, in départements favourable to him than in those leaning to Fillon (Huertas, 2013, 7-12; Barjon and Jeudy, 2013, 108-9; Latrous and Marteau, 2013, 31-5) . The result -long queues, abandoned by some party members before they voted -was deliberately organised 'disorganisation'. Party officials who questioned these practices resigned in protest or were sacked (Barjon and Jeudy, 2013, 103) .
This array of dirty tricks, plus an energetic, if demagogic, campaign, brought Copé close to a majority. To nail the outcome, Copé publicly claimed victory by 1,000 votes at 11.30 pm on polling day, 18 November. In doing so he by-passed the Commission de Contrôle des Opérations Électorales (CoCoE), the party body responsible for declaring the result; voting returns had not even been fully counted. This opened a murderous month in which Fillon too claimed victory, having discovered uncounted returns from three French overseas territories; in which the weak-willed chairman of the CoCoE, Patrice Gélard, announced that the new votes 'reversed' the result, before confirming Copé's victory after all, and adding that in any case, 'Fraud is part of the historical tradition of certain party federations' (Barjon and Jeudy, 2013, 83-4) To a degree, this corresponded to a radicalisation of right-wing voters in the wake of Hollande's election, as had occurred after Mitterrand's in 1981 (Haegel, 2012, 239-296) . On many issues, and especially immigration, polls showed UMP supporters as closer to the FN's positions than to those of other parties, including the MoDem; only on the future of the euro was the UMP closer to the moderate mainstream (Table 1) Policy as well as personality will continue to mark future leadership competition within the UMP.
Party competition and funding scandals (B-head)
'Retracer l'histoire du gaullisme', wrote Philippe Madelin (2001, 12) , 'c'est raconter la saga de ses finances.' In this if in few other respects, the UMP had been true to its Gaullist roots, and Sarkozy central to that fidelity. Haegel has observed that he remodelled the party as a business enterprise, borrowing techniques such as focus groups and performance targets from the corporate world, but also blurring the frontier between private profit and the public interest the UMP claimed to promote (Haegel, 2012, 167-171; Haegel, 2014) . Within the Gaullist party tradition, though, that was not wholly new. The President's team had omitted to declare certain receipts and expenses on the ground that they served the UMP rather than the presidential campaign directly, or that normal presidential expenses covered them. As adjusted by the Constitutional Council, Sarkozy's spending, at 22,975,118 euros, was 7.8 per cent higher than declared, and, crucially, 2.1 per cent higher than the maximum authorised for candidates receiving state campaign finance. 
Conclusion (A-head)
In December 1976, Jacques Chirac had launched the RPR as a revived neo-Gaullist party and a vehicle for his own future presidential campaigns. When he closed it down 26 years later it had become a toxic brand, lacking activists and contaminated by internecine rivalries and financial scandals (Knapp, 2004, 87, 267) . The UMP, the successor party, has taken less than half the time to reach a comparable position. To a degree, the same causes have produced the same effects: a leadership-focused party, with a historic tendency to confuse political finance and private profit, lacking a shared and respected body of rules, and finally lacking confidence in its leader. The acceleration has been largely the work of Sarkozy himself, a president more fascinated than any of his predecessors with speed and with communication and the wealth that goes with it (Duhamel and Field, 2008) . But the UMP's fate, even to its detractors,
should not be a matter for indifference. On the contrary, the importance for French democracy of a healthy UMP with a strong presidential candidate, and a working alliance with the Centre, could hardly be higher. The alternative, given the Left's continuing discredit, is for the FN to become the first party of France, and not only at the European elections.
